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Civil Infrastructure is needed both in the developed world and in developing 
countries. However, governments alone can no longer deliver the much needed projects 
mainly because of lack of money, but also due to the lack of technical skills and a 
changing type of citizenry. In today’s world, governments have to consult the market 
place to efficiently and optimally deliver the much needed infrastructure. The case for 
Public-Private Partnerships being better than the options of government run projects or 
fully privatized projects is that Public-Private Partnerships offer real advantages in three 
major areas: 1) risk benefits (financial, legal and project related benefits), 2) management 
and communication benefits (within the partnership but also importantly between both 
partners and the general public), and 3) the value addition to the public common good.  
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Introduction 
There is need for new civil infrastructure in the developing countries like Uganda 
and an equal need for rebuilding the old infrastructure in some developed countries like 
the U.S.A. Bult-Spiering and Dewulf (34) divide infrastructure into two categories. 1) 
‘hard’ or ‘economic’ infrastructure include: roads, transport systems, communications, 
water and sewerage, electricity, gas and ports. 2) ‘soft’ or ‘social’ infrastructure include:  
schools, universities, research facilities, military housing, prisons, hospitals, libraries, 
public buildings and parks. Civil Infrastructure is vital for economic production, 
distribution of economic output and for citizens’ overall quality of life. Capital 
budgeting1 for infrastructure is the process of evaluating which infrastructure project is 
feasibility and also how to go about getting the finances for the project.  
 Due to several factors, money being the primary one, governments can not fund 
massive infrastructure projects on their own. This has led to a paradigm shift in the 
relationship between government and the marketplace. According to Bult-Spiering and 
Dewulf, the public is now more interested in output and performance in its evaluation of 
government’s role. Therefore, governments all over the world are increasingly finding 
creative ways to tap the potential inherent within the marketplace in order to deliver 
public goods. Public-Private Partnerships [PPPs] is one framework by which 
governments and private corporations are coming together to deliver infrastructure to the 
general public. Public-Private collaboration has a wide range of formulation as the 
spectrum in Appendix A shows, but for this paper I will consider two specific types: 
Concessions and Joint Ventures. Concessions involve the government transferring all 
rights to a private party, while Joint Ventures involve both the private entity and the 
 
1 See Pg. 6 for details on capital budgeting.  
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government sharing all risks and responsibilities for the project. Concessions are usually 
project oriented while joint ventures are usually policy oriented (Bult-Spiering & Dewulf, 
12).  
PPPs are different from privatization because they involve the government and 
private sector sharing costs, revenues and responsibilities while in privatization, 
everything is transferred to private hands. Bult-Spiering and Dewulf (7) also differentiate 
PPP from other organizational structures like Alliances and Partnering. Alliances provide 
non-adversarial incentive arrangements for project coalition members on a single project 
with most risks allocated to either the public or the private party. Partnering refers to the 
formal arrangements between members of a project coalition under which they work 
together on a program of projects. Partnering is entirely based on principles of supply 
chain where one partner supplies something without being involved in the activities or 
execution of the overall project (Bult-Spiering & Dewulf, 7)   
In this day and age, governments no longer hold absolute power in their effort to 
provide public infrastructure. The only exceptions to this rule are communist 
governments like China or North Korea. For such governments, when there is an 
infrastructure need, however massive or unpopular its implementation might be, the 
governments just dictate all the terms. A very good example of this is the Three Gorges 
Dam in China, in which the government forcefully uprooted millions of people from their 
homes because it had decided to build a power generating dam at any cost. The project 
also caused thousands of acres of land with archeological significance to be submerged 
by the ensuing reservoir lake. In non-communist democracies like Uganda or the U.S.A, 
it’s in the government’s best interest to solicit private involvement so that financial 
burden is transferred or shared. My paper uses the example of TxDOT’s projects to 




My objective in writing this report is to explore the best ways that public 
infrastructure can be delivered in the era of modern economics and liberal democracies. 
The report is exploring the issues surrounding the hybrid project procurement model 
called Public Private Partnership. I am investigating its advantages over traditional 
project procurement models, i.e government monopolies and purely privatized projects. 
Specifically, I am proposing the thesis that public infrastructure projects can best be 
procured when governments enter formal partnerships with private parties either by 
forming a Joint Venture or a concession. The Public Private Partnership formed ends up 
providing more value to society than either government or privatized firm would have 
done.    My hypothesis in support of PPPs stems from the fact that each passing day, the 
citizenry is getting empowered financially and managerially. As a result, governments no 
longer have the monopoly of knowing, let alone being able to deliver, the best public 
civil infrastructure. Even if they do, by their bureaucratic nature, governments are 




The nature of my research was primarily exploratory literature research (both 
library and online), complimented with input from two industry experts in the form of a 
questionnaire. However, the actual method of analysis was using Decision Tree Analysis 
and Monte Carlo Simulation to analyze a case study. The exploratory nature of my 
research involved me reading books and reports written about the subject of Public 
Private Partnerships and a few Testimonials or presentations about specific aspects of 
PPPs. The industry expert part of my research involved using a questionnaire that I sent 
to two Civil Engineering professionals with direct expertise in Civil Infrastructure Public-
Private Partnerships.  
The topic of PPPs has become very popular in many Industries and Countries, 
such that I am certain the limited nature of my research might not have done justice to it. 
Specifically, since the topic is of a dynamic nature, relying on old literature like I did 
might not uncover the most pressing current issues with PPPs. Also, one case study in 
one part of Texas does not do justice to a subject matter that is as varied as there are 
different firms and forms of public enterprises. A few more case studies would have 
greatly strengthened my research.  Furthermore, to improve the quality of my research I 
could have included some field trips to actual PPP projects, I could have used more 
consultations with experts in different parts of the country/world, and lastly in the 
statistical and decision tree analyses section, I should have used a more robust probability 
encoding method for the raw data. I did not do these improvements for three main 
reasons. One, an elaborate research and analysis would have been overkill given that I 
have been doing this research on a part time basis. Two, improvements like field trips 
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would cost money, which I was not in a position to supply. Three, the requirement of a 30 
page report may not merit such elaborate research.     
Capital Budgeting 
Capital budgeting is the decision-making process of “making and managing 
expenditure on long-lived assets” (Ross, el al, 2). The process is used to find out if a 
potential project investment should be accepted or rejected. Since any public 
infrastructure by design will last a long time, there is a need to use capital budgeting 
methods in evaluating its feasibility and suitability both financially and 
socially/politically. There are Seven major methods of carrying out capital budgeting: 
1. Net Present Value (NPV): A capital budgeting method which uses the net value 
of all future cash flows discounted to the present time.  NPV = rt
Ct
)1( +
, where Ct 
is cash flow at time t, and r is the appropriate discount rate. This is an easy and 
straight forward way to base investment decision on the fundamental financial 
rule or “a dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow.” This method is the 
most common and it is the one I use in my analysis part. You accept a project if 
the NPV is ≥ 0. 
2. Payback period: This is a capital budget method which bases its decision on the 
amount of time it takes for an investment to recover the investment money. For 
example if a company chooses a payback period of 10 years, it rejects all projects 
whose payback period is more than 10 years and accepts the projects with the 
shortest payback period among those with less than 10 years.  
3. Discounted Payback Period: This is similar to the above Payback Period 
Method except that all the cash flows are discounted, usually to the present time.  
4. The Average Accounting Return: This is a capital budgeting method which uses 
the average return shown on the accounting records. “The average accounting 
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return is the average project earnings after taxes and depreciation, divided by the 
average book value of the investment during its life (Ross, el al, 209). 
5. Internal Rate of Return (IRR): This is the closest method to the ubiquitous 
NPV method.  It uses the discounted cash flow when NPV equals Zero to 
calculate a rate of return without considering outside factors like inflation and 
financial interest rates. The rate is intrinsic to the project. If n is the period, N is 
the total number of periods and Cn is the cash flow, the internal rate of return, R, 
is when NPV equals 0 according to the following formula: 
  
6. The Profitability Index (PI): This is a capital budgeting method which employs 
the ratio of the present value of the future expected cash flows after initial 
investment divided by the amount of the initial investment.                              
PI = 
tlInvestmenPVofInitia
FlowsPVofFuture . You accept a project if the P I is >1. 
7. Modified Internal Rate of Return (MIRR): This is a capital budgeting method 
which corrects two of the major problems inherit in the IRR method: the fact that 
IRR does not correctly give answers to projects with alternative positive and 
negative cash flows, and the assumption by the IRR method that positive cash 
flows are reinvested at the same rate of return as the project that generated them.  
The MIRR formula is: 
Where n is the number of equal periods at the end of which the cash flows occur, 
PV is the present value at the beginning of the first period, while FV is the future 
value at the end of the last period (Wikipedia). Whereas the IRR method assumes 
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that reinvestment occurs at the IRR rate, MIRR corrects this shortcoming by using 
the rate at which a company borrows capital –the WACC2—to evaluate projects.  
8. Equivalent Annual Cost (EAC): This is a capital budgeting method which uses 
the discounted cost per year of owning and operating an asset. You calculate it by 




 A,t,r is annuity ‘A’ at the rate ‘r’ for ‘t’ time periods.  
It is worth noting that all the above capital budgeting methods only consider 
financial aspects of making a decision on which project to invest in. But any good 
decision maker should not make an investment capital budgeting decision solely based on 
financial issues. Therefore in evaluating whether the government or private firms or a 
PPP would be best for project development, I use the NPV capital budgeting method –the 
commonest method- but in tandem with intangible benefits/costs like social and 
environmental issues and public opposition.  
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2 Weighted Average Cost of Capital: this is the minimum rate that a company has to repay all the people 
and entities that have invested capital in the company, e.g creditors and owners. 
Case Study: The Central Texas Turnpike System  
 
(Photo Source: www.sh130.com) 
Figure 1: A portion of the SH 130 
The Central Texas Turnpike System [CTTS] project is a massive 3.6 billion dollar 
undertaking by the Texas Department of Transportation [TxDOT]. The system was 
initiated in 2002. According to the project’s website3 , when finished, the project will add 
65 miles to the central Texas roadway corridor that “will improve overall traffic mobility, 
facilitate access to regional services, and increase travel safety for Central Texas 
residents, workers, and visitors.” The system is divided into three phases, the 49 mile 
long SH 130 road project , the 13 mile long SH 45 North project, and the six lane Loop 1 
divided highway which was finished in 2006. The total cost of the project includes 
 9
                                                 
3 http://www.centraltexasturnpike.org/ctts/ 
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money for design, construction, right of way acquisition, and financing costs (debt 
service, interest, insurance, etc). 
The main portion of this system, the SH 130 project was divided into two parts: 
segments 1 to 4 and segments 5 & 6. The first part was handled by the Lone Star 
Infrastructure, a Joint Venture. Segments 5 & 6 have been made possible due to a PPP 
formed between the various governmental entities, led by TxDOT but also involving the 
city of Austin, surrounding counties and the Federal government and a private 
concessionaire. TxDOT has granted a 50 year concession of the project to Cintra/Zachry, 
a concessionaire led by the Spanish giant company Cintra Concessiones de 
Infrastructura de Transporte, S.A and the San Antonio based Zachry Construction 
Corporation, (See Appendix C for details of the concession).  
One of the sources for my data concerning this project was Mr. Mike Walty, PE 
who worked on the SH 130 project as a Project Manager. Below is a sample of the 
information I was able to get from him. This is an email from October 19th, 2009. 
Anyway, as for SH 130, Segments 5 & 6 (basically the portion of the corridor 
extending from SH 45SE / US 183 to IH-10) were originally part of the EDA 
("Exclusive Development Agreement", later dubbed a "Comprehensive 
Development Agreement" to better describe the nature of the contract work as 
"comprehensive" in nature, e.g. design, build, and everything in between) that I 
was working on.  However, the EDA had certain NTP4 triggers, one of which was 
to grant LSI the green light to *proceed* with Segments 5 & 6.  This NTP was 
never issued as a result of TxDOT's intent to let this work out as a concession. 
 
The nature of a concession agreement is fairly different than the CDA model, that 
is, because the concessionaire brings their own equity to the table and takes on 
some operational risk.  In addition, there is no on-going maintenance requirement, 
unlike the CDA that also obligates LSI in Segments 1 - 4 to keep a certain level of 
quality to the roadway running surface (amongst other incidental facilities).  In 
essence, the concessionaire may opt to build a dirt road in Segments 5 & 6, but 
market forces would likely expose that risk, which remains with the contractor. 
 
The end result is that the road gets constructed far faster than if let traditionally by 
 
4 NTP: Notice To Proceed. 
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TxDOT and, unlike the previous CDA for the work, some operational risks are 
transferred to the contractor.  There are, of course, some very natural political 
issues involved in such a deal, the extents of which I won't get into in this email. 
From the financial summary table in Appendix C, you can see that majority of the 
money for the project came from the 2002 bond issued by the TxDOT. There was also 
money contribution from TIFIA5 and local contributions for Rights of Way.  According 
to the law HB 3588 that established the Comprehensive Development Agreements 
(CDA)6 in May 2003, CDAs have three main models: Design-Build or Design-Build-
Maintain, Strategic Business Partnerships and Concession (Smith, 7). There are two main 
procurement methods based on CDAs, the CTTS projects uses the first one called 
Solicited Procurement, whereby TxDOT solicits bids from respective parties. Five steps 
are involved in the procurement, “Issue RFQ, Evaluate and short-list teams,  Issue 
Request for Detailed Proposals to short-listed teams, Evaluate detailed proposals and 
select apparent best value, and Limited negotiations and award” (Smith, 9). 
From all the information I gathered from Mr. Watry and from the documents on 
the Project website, I was able to extract financial data that allowed me to perform a 
decision tree analysis and a Monte Carlo simulation model to analyze the three project 
delivery alternatives for SH 130 segments 5 & 6.  
 
DECISION TREE ANALYSIS FOR SH 130 PHASE 5 & 6 
In order to verify the decision making process by TxDOT in regard to choosing a 
project delivery method for SH 130 phases 5 & 6, I used PrecisionTree software to model 
 
5 Transportation Infrastructure Financing and Innovation Act was enacted by Congress in 1998 to provide 
lines of credit and loans for transportation projects that have national or regional significance.  
6 CDA is an agreement with one entity (the developer) to design, develop, construct, finance, acquire, 
operate and/or maintain certain kinds of facilities (Smith, 5).  
the alternatives that TxDOT had. The following table shows the financial estimates for 
segments 5 & 6. 
Contract Costs
Amount Design ROW, Util
Estimate 1,510 1,206 304
Final 1,370
SH 130 SEGMENTS 5 & 6
 
Table 1: SH 130 Segments 5 & 6 Financials. 
According to the TxDOT testimony of July 22, 2008 (Russell, P.E), TxDOT had 
four alternatives available to construct segments 5 & 6, see table below.  
 
ALTERNATIVES FOR SH 130 SEGMENTS 5 & 6 
Contract Design ROW, Others, R Contribution NPV
amount Utilities
1 Government pay as you go 1,370 NA N.A N.A N.A
2 Government munical bond program* 1,370 -1,030 -340 0
3 Private (competitive CDA)
If private company contributes 1,370 break-even 0
No contribution and higher ROW & Utilities** 1,370 -304 -304
4 PPP (Cintra/Zachry concession)***
Upfront Project NPV
25 750 1,370 775 400  
Table 2: Alternatives for SH 130 Segments 5 & 6 
 Alternative 1 was not financially feasible, so there are no monetary values given.  
 *Alternative 2 was not chosen because according to Mr. Russell, it involved an 
extra cost of 700MM over the cost of a Comprehensive Development Agreement 
(CDA).  
 ** Alternative 3, the competitive CDA would only be feasible if at least TxDOT 
broke even financially, i.e if there was an NPV of Zero. However, due to the fact 
that TxDOT would not be helping out with ROW acquisition and utilities 
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relocation in terms of eminent domain7 or statutory condemnation, the private 
firm would incur greater expenses which it would pass onto the public or TxDOT. 
According to Mr. Selden8, some parcel owners for ROW acquisition should have 
been paid 2 or 3 times the amount of money that TxDOT was offering. I estimated 
a low end value equal to cost overrun of ROW acquisition, which came to be 304 
MM. The private firm would have to pass this cost back to TxDOT or the public. 
  ***Alternative 4 is the concession by Cintra/Zachry. According to TxDOT’s 
Frank Holzmann, P.E, this alternative leads to an NPV of 750 MM which would 
be shared between the concessionaire and TxDOT. Over the lifespan of 50 years, 
TxDOT share would increase until it was 50% i.e 375, but there was a 25MM 
down payment by the concessionaire to TxDOT, which brings the total cash 
inflow to 400MM.  
 
I extracted the following probability values from the literature to model my 
decision in precision tree.  
Synergistic private involvement 60%
Unsynergistic private involvement 40%
Favorable PPP 50%
Unfavorable PPP 50%
Synergistic given favorable 70%
Unsynergistic given favorable 30%
Synergistic given unfavorable 40%
Unsynergistic given unfavorable 60%
PROBABILITY VALUES
 
Table 3: Probability Values 
                                                 
7 Eminent Domain: the right by a government entity to deprive private people of their property by legally 
grabbing the property at market or below market price.  
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8  A reporter with CorridorNews.com 
 The base decision tree is given below. R stands for the intangible cost associated 
with public opposition to the project and also overrun costs due to ROW acquisition and 
utility relocations without government help. It is very important to quantify public 
opposition because it could be the difference between abandonment and a project going 
forward. For example, the mother of the CTTS project, the 800 mile project called the 
Trans-Texas Corridor (for which Cintra/Zachry was participating) got abandoned due to 
extreme public opposition that led TxDOT to adopt the “No Build” option 
(www.tollroadnews.com).   For my analysis, I use an R value of Zero, but later on I do a 
sensitivity analysis on how the NPV value changes with changing values for R. All 




























































Figure 2: Base decision tree 
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Calculating the Equations of Expected Monetary Values incorporating R 
The EMV at C1 = 0.6 (400) + 0.4 (-304 - R) = 118.4 -0.4 R 
The EMV at C2 = 0.7 (400) + 0.3 (-304 – R) = 188.8 – 0.3R  
The EMV at C3 = 0.4 (400) + 0.6 (-304 – R) = -22.4 – 0.6 R 
The EMV at D2 depends on which option is greater.  
0 = 188.8 – 0.3R, R = 629.33 ,  
 For R ≥ 629.33, D2 EMV = 0 , i.e Choose government option 
For R ≤ 629.33, D2 EMV = 188.8 – 0.3 R , i.e Choose private option 
The EMV at D3 depends on which option is greater.  
0 = -22.4 – 0.6R, R = -37.33,  
 For R ≥ -37.33, D3 EMV = 0 , i.e Choose government option 
For R ≤ -37.33, D3 EMV = -22.4 – 0.6 R , i.e Choose private option 
The EMV at C4 depends on the value of R.  
For R ≥ 629.33, C4 EMV = 0.5 (0) + 0.5 (0) = 0,  
 For -37.33 ≤ R ≤ 629.33, C4 EMV = 0.5 (188.8 – 0.3 R) + 0.5 (0) 
= 94.4 – 0.15 R 
For R ≤ -37.33, C4 EMV = 0.5 (188.8 – 0.3 R) + 0.5 (-22.4-0.6R),  
= 83.2 – 0.45 R 
The EMV at D1 depends on the value of R.  
For R ≥ 629.33, e.g 700, Choose government option  
 For -37.33 ≤ R ≤ 629.33, first compare C1 to C4  
118.4 – 0.4R = 94.4 – 0.15 R, R = 96 
Therefore for 96 ≤ R ≤ 629.33, choose PPP 
Otherwise, for -37.33 ≤ R ≤ 96, choose private 
For -37.33 ≤ R ≤ 629.33, second compare C1 to 0 (gov’t) 
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118.4 -0.4 R = 0, R = 296 
Therefore for 96 ≤ R ≤ 296, choose PPP, but private is better than 
gov’t. 
Otherwise, for 296 ≤ R ≤ 629.33, choose PPP, but gov’t is better 
than private. 
For R ≤ -37.33, equate C1 to C4  
118.4 – 0. 4 R = 83.2 – 0.45 R, R = -704,  
Therefore for -704 ≤ R ≤ -37.33, choose private 
Otherwise, for R ≤ -704, choose PPP 
Final recommendation: Based on the above calculations whose results are shown in 
Figure 3, TxDOT should make the following decisions.  
If R ≥ 629.33, TxDOT should choose the traditional government bonds method. 
If 96 ≤ R ≤ 629.33, TxDOT should research and if it finds that there is synergy 
with a private firm, it should choose the PPP option. If no synergy, choose 
the private firm option if 96 ≤ R ≤ 296, but for 296 ≤ R ≤ 629.33 choose 
gov’t.  
If -704 ≤ R ≤ 96, TxDOT should choose the Private option 
If R ≤ -704, TxDOT should choose the PPP option.  
The above recommendations go beyond mere capital budgeting methodology —
which considers only financial values—to include the intangible costs, R.  
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Figure 3a. Sensitivity graph of NPV to the Intangible Cost (a) 



















    Choose private      PPP if Synergy   Choose gov't
PPP      if no synergy,
     private for ≤ 296
     Gov't for ≥296  
Figure 3b. Sensitivity graph of NPV to the Intangible Cost (b) 
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I also performed an analysis on the value of information concerning whether there 
would be synergy between the government and a private firm getting involved in the 


















Figure 4: Base decision tree without any information 
When perfect information about synergy is available, the decision tree looks like 
























Figure 5: Decision tree with perfect information 
The expected value of perfect information (EVPI) is the difference between the 
EMV of Figure 5 and EMV of Figure 4. That is 240 – 118.4 = 121.6. This means that 
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TxDOT can spend up to $121,600,000 to gather perfect information about whether there 
would be synergy if the private firm partners with TxDOT. This EVPI value can also be 
calculated by finding the weighted average of the VPI for each of the perfect information. 
That is, the VPI when the information is that there is synergy will be zero because this 
information would lead TxDot to choose the private option which is what it would have 
chosen without any information. Hence, VPI (Synergy) = 0.  However, if the information 
is that there is no synergy, this scenario would result in choosing the government option 
over the private option, so there is value in this information. VPI (No Synergy) = 0 – -304 
= 304. The EVPI would be 0.6 (0) + 0.4 (304) = 121.6 (i.e $121,600,000).   
The expected value of sample information (EVSI) is the difference between the 
decision tree when you are researching the PPP option, Figure 2 (when R=0) and the 
decision tree when no information is available, Figure 4. EVSI = 118.4 – 118.4 = 0. This 
is the value that TxDOT should spend to get a little amount of information regarding the 
possibility of there being synergy between TxDOT and private firm involvement. Note 
that this value ranges from 0 to the EVPI value. For any given positive value of R, Figure 
2’s EMV would decrease, making the EVSI increase accordingly. But the EVSI value 
can never exceed the EVPI value. Depending on R value, TxDOT can spend money on 
researching the synergy involved with a PPP, but this expense will max out at $121.6 
MM (the EVPI), after which it is not financially justified to spend money. 
I also carried out an analysis on the value of perfect control over the situation. 
That is, what can TxDOT spend in order to fix the synergy involved with a PPP, e.g in 
terms of legislating that would force certain scenarios. Figure 6 below shows the decision 
tree of perfectly controlling the idea of there being synergy between private involvement 
























Figure 6: Decision tree showing perfect control.  
The expected value of perfect control (EVPC) is the difference between Figure 6 
and the base decision tree Figure 2. EVPC = 400 – 118.4 = 281.6 , i.e $281,600,000 . 
This is the value that TxDOT should spend in order to perfectly control there being 
synergy when a private firm gets involved with the project.  
 
MONTE CARLO SIMULATION  ANALYSIS FOR SH 130 SEGMENTS 5 & 6 
 
I performed a Monte Carlo simulation model of the three alternatives using 
@Risk. I used a simulation run of 1000 iterations. The table below shows the three input 
values I used for each alternative and the NPV output value. I used a triangular 
distribution for all input values.  
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MONTE CARLO SIMULATION MODEL
Contract $ Costs $ Inflow $ NPV $
1 Government Option 1370 -2013 -643
2 Private Company Option 1370 -1355 15
3 PPP Option 1370 -1322 400 448
NOTE: All values are in millions of dollars.
i Government Option Costs = RiskTriang (-3970, -1720, -350)
ii Private Company Option Costs = RiskTriang(-2474, -1322, -270)
iii PPP Option Costs = RiskTriang(-1674, -1322, -970)
iv PPP Option Inflow = RiskTriang(300,400,500)
v Outputs (NPV) = RiskOutput()+(Contract $ + Costs $ + Inflow $)  
Table 4: Monte Carlo Simulation Model  
The modeling produced the following results: 
MONTE CARLO SIMULATIN RESULTS
Name Minimum Mean Maximum x1 p1 x2 p2 x2-x1 p2-p1 Errors
Output 1 Government Option / NPV $ -2521 -643 1008 -1967 5% 520 95% 2487 90% 0
Output 2 Private Company Option / NPV $ -1057 15 1080 -751 5% 758 95% 1509 90% 0
Output 3 PPP Option / NPV $ 61 448 824 199 5% 701 95% 503 90% 0
Input 1 Government Option / Costs $ -3891 -2013 -362 -3337 5% -850 95% 2487 90% 0
Input 2 Private Company Option / Costs $ -2427 -1355 -290 -2121 5% -612 95% 1509 90% 0
Input 3 PPP Option / Costs $ -1669 -1322 -984 -1563 5% -1081 95% 481 90% 0
Input 4 PPP Option / Inflow $ 304 400 496 331 5% 468 95% 137 90% 0  
Table 5: Monte Carlo Simulation results table  





Government Option / NPV $ / H37
Statistic Value %tile Value
Minimum -2521 5% -1967
Maximum 1008 10% -1700
Mean -643 15% -1498
Std Dev 747 20% -1325
Variance 557450.865 25% -1174
Skewness -0.229138147 30% -1038
Kurtosis 2.403453525 35% -914
Median -583 40% -797
Mode -326 45% -688
Left X -1967 50% -583
Left P 5% 55% -484
Right X 520 60% -390
Right P 95% 65% -299
Diff X 2487 70% -200
Diff P 90% 75% -95
#Errors 0 80% 22
Filter Min 85% 156
Filter Max 90% 316





Simulation Start Time 11/29/2009 11:33
Simulation Stop Time 11/29/2009 11:33
Number of Outputs 3
Sampling Type Latin Hypercube
Number of Iterations 1000
Number of Inputs 4
Workbook Name MR Data.xls
Number of Simulations 1
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Figure 7: Statistical results for the Government Option  
From the histogram above you can see that the probability of a negative NPV is 
79.1%. The 95% Confidence Interval (C.I) is obtained by the following statistical 
calculations. 
Sample Mean = -643, Sample Std. Dev = 747, n = 1000 , µ = ? 
2.5 percentile = -2157 , 97.5 percentile = 662 
95% C.I = P (-643 -1.96
1000
747 ≤ µ ≤ -643 +1.96
1000
747 ) 
  =  P (-643 – 46.3 ≤ µ ≤ -643 + 46.3) 
=  P (-689.3 ≤ µ ≤ -596.7) 
According to my analysis, there is a 95% statistical confidence that the mean of 
the Government option is between $-689,300,000 and $-596,700,000. This is very close 
to the TxDOT projection that this option would result in a -$700,000,000 NPV 
 
Simulation Results for
Private Company Option / NPV $ / H38
Statistic Value %tile Value
Minimum -1057 5% -751
Maximum 1080 10% -600
Mean 15 15% -489
Std Dev 450 20% -392
Variance 202733.205 25% -308
Skewness -0.043948268 30% -231
Kurtosis 2.40229411 35% -162
Median 22 40% -97
Mode 51 45% -36
Left X -751 50% 22
Left P 5% 55% 79
Right X 758 60% 137
Right P 95% 65% 198
Diff X 1509 70% 265
Diff P 90% 75% 339
#Errors 0 80% 418
Filter Min 85% 508
Filter Max 90% 617





Simulation Start Time 11/29/2009 11:33
Simulation Stop Time 11/29/2009 11:33
Number of Outputs 3
Sampling Type Latin Hypercube
Number of Iterations 1000
Number of Inputs 4
Workbook Name MR Data.xls
Number of Simulations 1
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Figure 8: Statistical results for the Private Option  
From the histogram above you can see that the probability of a negative NPV is 
48.1%. The 95% Confidence Interval (C.I) is obtained by the following statistical 
calculations. 
Sample Mean = 15, Sample Std. Dev = 450, n = 1000, µ = ? 
2.5 percentile = -856 , 97.5 percentile = 859  
95% C.I = P (15 -1.96
1000
450 ≤ µ ≤ 15 +1.96
1000
450 ) 
  = P (15 -27.9 ≤ µ ≤ 15 + 27.9) 
  = P (-12.9 ≤ µ ≤ 42.9) 
According to my analysis, there is a 95% statistical confidence that the mean of 




PPP Option / NPV $ / H39
Statistic Value %tile Value
Minimum 61.35314941 5% 198.5159607
Maximum 824.4714355 10% 248.1976624
Mean 447.9852913 15% 281.05896
Std Dev 150.052816 20% 315.4344482
Variance 22515.84758 25% 342.7839355
Skewness 0.019633458 30% 365.8458252
Kurtosis 2.5429237 35% 387.3262024
Median 447.9014587 40% 408.6166992
Mode 486.7930634 45% 428.2390747
Left X 198.5159607 50% 447.9014587
Left P 5% 55% 470.1437683
Right X 701.0460815 60% 487.5565796
Right P 95% 65% 506.6828003
Diff X 502.5301208 70% 524.6653442
Diff P 90% 75% 554.7658081
#Errors 0 80% 575.5440674
Filter Min 85% 603.6399536
Filter Max 90% 651.3557739





Simulation Start Time 11/29/2009 11:33
Simulation Stop Time 11/29/2009 11:33
Number of Outputs 3
Sampling Type Latin Hypercube
Number of Iterations 1000
Number of Inputs 4
Workbook Name MR Data.xls
Number of Simulations 1
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Figure 9: Statistical results for the PPP Option  
From the histogram above you can see that the probability of a negative NPV is 0. 
The 95% Confidence Interval (C.I) is obtained by the following statistical calculations 
Sample Mean = 448, Sample Std. Dev = 150, n = 1000 , µ = ? 
2.5 percentile = 171, 97.5 percentile = 739  
95% C.I = P (448 -1.96
1000
150 ≤ µ ≤ 448 +1.96
1000
150 ) 
  = P (448 -9.28 ≤ µ ≤ 448 + 9.28) 
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= P (438.73 ≤ µ ≤ 457.28) 
According to my analysis, there is a 95% statistical confidence that the mean of 
the PPP option is between $438,730,000 and $457,280,000. This is in agreement with 
TxDOT’s Concession contract which projects that the profit sharing will be $400 MM.  
Just like the results from the decision tree analysis, the PPP option offers the greatest 
possibility of attaining a high NPV value.  
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The Case for Public-Private Partnerships 
 
The case for Public-Private Partnerships explores how PPPs have numerous 
advantages over the two traditional models of project delivery: i.e government run 
projects and wholly privatized projects. Specifically, the advantages fall under three 
major categories: a) Risk benefits, b) Better management and communication, and c) 
Better value added to society. But first, I want to give a brief discussion of what PPPs are 
and their characteristics.  
 
PPP BACKGROUND 
The modern PPP model started in the U.S.A in the 1950s when the federal 
government solicited private investment in order to stimulate inner city infrastructure 
development and regional economic development (Bult-Spiering & Dewulf, 7). But the 
model really took shape in the 1980s as evidenced by President Carter’s Urban 
Development Action Grant9 (UDAG). Pierre & Peters give a list of eight factors that 
contributed to the development of PPPs. The main instigator was the citizenry’s interest 
shifting from government to governance issues. This meant that the public become more 
interested in efficiency and performance rather than the nature of government structure 
(Bult-Spiering & Dewulf, 1).  
1. Shift from politics towards the market 
2. Economic crises focused governments to consider their management 
intentions in perspective.  
3. Economic and political globalization forced adjustment of management 
intentions and changes in public institutions at a national level.  
 
9 This was a federal program enacted in the Jimmy Carter presidency (1977) with the purpose of loaning 
money to revitalize distressed urban centers by acting as an incentive for private sector investment.   
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4. Dissatisfaction with the government’s performance led to more private 
sector involvement in the enforcement of public tasks.  
5. Rise of “New Public Management” (NPM) and instruments as a counterpart 
to traditional, input-oriented management styles resulted in an increasing 
interest in output management, evaluations and separation of policy making 
and enforcement.  
6. Increasing attention on citizen participation and environmental issues.  
7. The increasing importance of sub-national and super-national institutions 
has resulted in a growing interest in multi-level governance.  
8. The tension between several new forms of public management and 
coordination on the one hand, and the old traditions and instruments  of 
public accountability on the other, resulted in the introduction of ‘new’ 
players (private parties, citizens, non-governmental organizations(NGOs)) 
in to the political process.  
 
Even if the formal PPP structure was started in the U.S.A, it could not be wholly 
copied in Europe because of the differences in culture between European and American 
ideas of public-private frameworks. In the U.S.A, the partnership always constitutes 
private party autonomy while in Europe it relies on public autonomy. The U.K is in 
between these two extremes. In the U.S.A, private provision of services is subsidized 
through public subsidies or vouchers and the private sector has discretion in 
implementing public policies. In the European case represented by France and Germany, 
the public or government always has the upper hand in directing the nature and workings 
of the partnership with no autonomy by the private party.  
As I mentioned in the Introduction, I will be concerned with two types of PPPs: 
Concessions and Joint Ventures. Concessions are the main type of PPP for civil 
infrastructure like roads and waste wastewater projects. Whereas Joint Ventures exist as 
separate corporate legal entities, Concessions have numerous legal structures. Joint 
ventures are sometimes called true PPP because they exist as an autonomous legal entity 
and the Public entity is both a shareholder and also the regulator. They also exhibit equal 
share of revenues, losses, and risks between the two parties. Concessions involve a 
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genuine transfer of risk usually from the public party to the private firm. They take on the 
general guideline of a concessionaire offering specific services during part of the life 
cycle of the project. For example a PFI (Public Financing Initiation) is a concession 
where a private firm provides all the money for a public project, DBFM (Design-Build-
Finance-Maintain) is where the private firm designs, builds, finances and also maintains 
the project, BOT(Build-Operate-Transfer) is where the private firm builds and operates 
the projects for a lease term at the end of which ownership is transferred to the public 
entity, BTO(Build-Transfer-Operate) is where the private party builds and transfers 
ownerships to the government but straight away leases the project/facility in order to 
operate it,  and DBFO (Design-Built-Finance-Operate) is where the private firm designs, 
builds, finances and also operates the project.  
In theory, governments can delivery public goods without the help of private 
parties, but in practice, there are factors that work to prevent governments from 
delivering the best and most efficient public goods. The main reasons that conspire to 
prevent governments from delivering public goods in the best and most efficient way are 
“lack of competitive forces, no force of contract, ingrained institutional practices, 
procurement restriction (proven technology required), and risk avoidance” (Norment, 9). 
When an appropriate private firm is brought on board, performance standards in the 
contract together with the firm’s business efficiencies should result into a better service 
or project delivery. 
It is important when setting up a PPP to realize that the public and private entities 
each have different interests that they are inclined to pursue. Therefore a good PPP 
contract will try to exploit the strengths from each party. According to Bult-Spiering & 
Dewulf (22,23) the public sector is usually interested in: 
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1. Legislation, regulations and authorities 
2. Political opinion and political influence 
3. Democratic decision-making processes. 
4. Minimization of funds 
5. Realization of a social goal 
 
While the private sector is interested in: 
 
1. Achieving returns on the invested funds 
2. Taking business risks 
3. Anticipating market and competitive developments 
4. Realization of a corporate goal 
Failure to recognize the inherent interests that lead each party to sign a PPP 




PPPs as separate entities can absorb risks that would otherwise be a burden if 
undertaken solely by either a government or private party. 
 
Financial Risks 
The first major financial risk that PPPs can absorb better is revenue-loss sharing. 
Many times, due to general economical turmoil, poor revenue projections or the onset of 
unforeseen circumstances, it is possible for the finished project to generate less money 
than initially projected. Another financial risk closely related to revenue-loss is credit 
risk, whereby a debtor is likely to default.  The PPP has flexibility to use the government 
entity to either issue bonds or waiver taxes and other financial burdens, or on the other 
hand the private entity can use its knowledge of the financial markets to move investment 
around or innovate better financial management schemes. In the CTTS case study project, 
the Cintra/Zachry Concessionaire has been able to assemble an innovative and diverse 
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group which includes PriceWaterhouseCooper and JP Morgan Securities (See Appendix 
C for details). This group has been able to innovate financial mechanisms that streamline 
the collecting and managing of all the monies from the bonds program, TIFIA, TxDOT, 
and local jurisdiction contributions.  For SH 130 segments 1 to 4, Lone Star Infrastructure 
successfully achieved the same financial benefits by exploiting TxDOT’s Comprehensive 
Development Agreement. According to the project’s website (http://www.sh130.com/), 
SH 130 was the first project to be “developed under a Comprehensive Development 
Agreement, [Which] allows the work of property acquisition, design and construction to 
be undertaken simultaneously.”  Lone Star Infrastructure was able to efficient manage the 
financial aspects of the project and expeditiously design and finish constructing on a 
schedule that was years ahead of a traditional government led project delivery method. 
 
Second, macro level risks or what economists call systematic risks might be too 
hard to be handled by one private firm. Akintoye, et al (37) define these risks as: 
 
They concern changes in broad economic conditions that affect a whole market. 
This, for example, may relate to changes in asset values as a result of systematic 
environmental factors. Other examples of market risks include changes in 
consumer spending, level of Industrial output, interest rates, exchange rates, 
energy prices, high-impact weather effects, etc 
Systematic risks can not completely be avoided but by having a private firm locked 
together with a government entity, the risks are efficiently redistributed around. For 
example, system risks like political changes or macro-economic changes can be absorbed 
best by governments. In third world countries, only the government has the leverage to 
maneuver over a tumultuous political landscape. In the case of exchange and interest 
rates, only the government has the ability to manipulate the financial landscape while the 
private party can concentrate on the micro details of executing the actual project.   
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Third, there is a tendency for government to undertake grandiose non-economic 
projects that might not delivery the necessary benefit to the public. This is partly due to 
political reasons, or personal egos (Savas, 240). It is not unheard of for a government 
entity to ignore conclusions of particular capital budgeting calculation, and instead make 
a ‘political reason’ to go ahead with project development. PPPs prevent this government 
tendency by bringing in professional private firms which are very experienced in 
identifying and efficiently selecting profit generating projects based on the appropriate 
capital budgeting mechanism. By involving private sponsors and experienced commercial 
lenders, in-depth review of the technical and financial feasibility of the project is assured 
(Savas, 240). 
Fourth, private firms rely on high risk high return investment capital for their 
finances, while governments rely on low risk low return bonds to get financing. In these 
perpetually uncertain economic times, sometimes the market is more favorable for low 
risk investments while in other times, it is more favorable for high risk high return 
investments. PPPs are well positioned to manage this risk by having the option to either 
borrow money via the government party or via the private party or exploit their extensive 
financial background in all forms of capital budgeting to appropriately decide on the best 
mix of public and  private funding source. For example, in the SH 130 case, 
Cintra/Zachry is providing some financing for operations while government entities are 
providing some money for ROW acquisition.  
Fifth, since private firms are quick to adjust to changing economic times unlike 
government entities that are fraught with bureaucratic ways of doing business, a PPP is 
agile and well positioned to ride with the economic tide. The overwhelming positive NPV 
values from the Decision Tree analysis and Monte Carlo simulation validate the financial 





There are two main legal risks that a PPP is better situated to absorb than either a 
government entity or private entity going it all alone.  
The first one is contractual risk. Since a PPP is an autonomous legal entity, it can 
absorb any risk resulting from contractual agreement without impacting the parent private 
firm or public party adversely. For the case of the CTTS project, there was a contractual 
innovation called the Comprehensive Development Agreement (CDA) which allowed for 
efficiency in the whole project life cycle because the same company is retained for 
design, construction, Right of Way acquisition, permitting and other aspects of the 
project.     
Secondly, because governments are responsible for making laws and regulations, 
having a government entity on board helps a PPP avoid unforeseen risks emanating from 
new or intricate laws and regulations. Also, if a law or regulation would adversary affect 
a private firm or a public entity, having a PPP as a legal entity helps to channel risk from 
the target party to the other party. The result is that the intended party is spared the 
adverse impact of the regulation. Furthermore, the private party gains from the 
government having the regulatory prerogative to issue eminent domain to acquire land or 
legislate non-competitive zones whereby the private firm will have the economic 
advantage to participate in a certain economic area for a given length of time. 
 
Project Risks 
There are three main benefits that a PPP can offer in regard to project risks. 
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First, project selection as far as procurement risks are concerned can be handled 
better with a concerted effort between private firms and public entities. Akintola et al 
(35) list five areas where procurement risks can arise: land acquisition for a project, 
design of building or facilities, construction of facilities, commissioning of projects or 
facilities, and management of facilities.  In a PPP, the government entity can provide 
cheap access to policy frameworks to guide the project while the private entity 
participates in the detailed analysis using industry proven standards and techniques. Mr. 
Watry said that the move from a TxDOT-run CTTS project to the CDA mechanism cut a 
lot of red tape and led to the project starting a lot earlier than it would have started under 
traditional methods.  Also, Mr. Russell’s TxDOT testimonial lists 21 project risks that 
were either fully born by Cintra/Zachry to the relief of TxDOT (Russell, 4, 5) 
Second, there is a big benefit to having a duo entity which can leverage its 
government connection in regard to   risks involved with public codes, licensing and 
permitting. A solo private firm could face a lot of delay and more costs trying to dig 
through extensive public code or applying for permits and licenses.  This benefit extends 
into avoiding other project risks like design risks, construction risks due to time and 
budget issues and change orders or field orders, and operation and maintenance risks due 
to issues that have to be handled during the maintenance period of a project. These 
benefits depend on the actual contractual delivery method of the PPP. As I mentioned in 
the above background sub-section, there are several contractual delivery methods of a 
PPP. If the delivery method is BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer), this is very advantageous 
in that the Concessionaire will operate the facility for the leased time ( 50 years for the 
SH 130 case study) during which it shoulders all the burdens that would have been 
incurred by the public entity or passed onto the general public.    
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Third, another crucial advantage that a PPP offers is the ability to exploit the 
flexibility needed to make real options. Real options are “the adjustments that a firm can 
make after a project is accepted”(Ross, et al, 284). The three major real options are: a) the 
option to expand, b) the option to abandon, c) timing options. A government run 
infrastructure project will not be flexible enough, due to its inherit bureaucratic nature, to 
make snap decisions needed in face of a new opportunity available to expand, abandon a 
project or start a particular project at a different time.  For example in the case study, 
under a government run project, all segments 1 to 6 would have been designed, built and 
operated in the same way, but under a concessionary PPP, the PPP had the option to 
smoothly and quickly change the design and construction details of segments 5 and 6 to 
meet the prevailing market realities.  
 
 
MANAGEMENT AND COMMUNICATION 
PPPs are very beneficial in that formal decision making about administration and 
project organization is shared as opposed to the task being a burden on a private firm or a 
public entity. For example, since government entities are used to democratic decision 
making, this habit can rubber off well into the PPP management culture so that decisions 
are made by consensus or formal negotiation. This is very import because it prevents the 
tendency for a private firm going it alone and making draconian un-democratic decisions 
in regard to important issues that might adversely affect the general public.  
Good communication is a fundamental benefit that PPPs provide. This is because 
communication is oftentimes the glue for any venture that involves people, tasks and 
responsibilities. Whereas risk evaluation and value analysis are important contributions 
of PPPs, communicating those issues and actually managing the intricate delicate 
relations between the private and public partners and also between the partners and the 
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general public are paramount to the final dividend that a project can reap from a PPP.  
For the CTTS case study, TxDOT failed in this very important respect when it went about 
the actual award of concession to Cintra/Zachry in a non-transparent fashion. According 
to Tollroad News:  
 
A week ago at the very height of the gathering political storm over toll 
concessions in the state legislature, and just as veto-proof majorities were being 
registered for moratorium bills, Texas DOT (TxDOT) quietly signed the final 
concession agreement document for SH130/5&6 with Cintra Zachry. 
Newsworthy? You better believe it. But out of TxDOT, no press release, no 
statement, nothing.  
This is a prime example of how an actual PPP might not go about doing businesses 
according to the ideal model. But such a shortcoming does not reflect adversely on the 
robustness of the PPP model.  
PPPs are based on a network mechanism of economic activity. This mechanism is 
very different from the traditional two mechanisms of hierarchy and market, which are 
mainly governed by the transaction cost of the activity (Bult-Spiering & Dewulf, 25). For 
networks, the activities of the public and private entity overlap. According to Bult-
Spiering and Dewulf, unlike the other two mechanisms, networks take into account 
personal relations, reputation and trust.  For a successful PPP, the participants in the 
network have non-hierarchical long-lasting relations, even after the project is done. 
Network relations are activated for solving specific problems. For as long as the project is 
alive or under operation, the public and private network is alive. In this way, networks are 
therefore very dynamic: actors enter and depart, power positions change and different 
networks can come together, but the overall inter-connectedness remains. Because of the 
dynamic nature, the reputation of the actors is very important. Relations with a partner 
who has a negative reputation will not be activated to the same degree as a relation with 
another partner with positive reputation. Therefore, the PPP framework offers a conduit 
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in which the project stakeholders are in constant communication with all project 
stakeholders who also include the general public. 
There is a lot of efficiency reaped by having a PPP manage the actual construction 
of the project. Whereas a private firm can “build more quickly and more cost effectively 
than government usually can, and therefore satisfies public needs more quickly at lower 
cost,” (Savas 240), this could turn into a disadvantage if government’s strict standards 
and codes are not well understood by the private firm. On the other hand, government 
building alone can not achieve the quickness of private firms because its inherent 
bureaucratic constraints and laborious procurement means translate into delayed project 
planning and schedule. A successful project managed through a PPP will have a private 
party handling procurement to eliminate bottlenecks, but have the government entity 
streamline the project vis-à-vis public code and regulations.   This arrangement prevents 
wasting a lot of private capital to manage the regulatory side of operations. 
 
VALUE ADDITION 
There are numerous ways that PPPs add more value to economic activities than a 
traditional market or hierarchy mechanism (government) will do. In the CTTS case study, 
the CDA procurement method is based on choosing a project partner using a “a best 
value selection process”. Best value is defined as price and other factors. These other 
factors are: “technical design/approach, innovation, qualifications, experience, key 
personnel, minimizing public impacts (i.e traffic maintenance), QA/QC approach, 
schedule” (Smith, 11). Without a PPP, the public or private entity can soon realize that it 
can not achieve its goals of adding value if it acts alone. Bult-Spiering and Dewulf (28) 
list four ways in which value is added:  
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1) Added value in content. This comes in the form of using an integrated 
creativity framework to solve problems and execute project functions. Cooperation by the 
planner, builder and operator naturally leads to more efficiency. Also, innovation in 
content is possible because of the diversity of input by different sources. The CTTS 
project achieved this benefit by bringing together diverse companies, diverse both in 
Industry and geography: The Spanish Ferrovial-Agroman, Earth Tech, 
PriceWaterhouseCooper, JP Morgan Securities, Bracewell and Patterson, Pate Engineers 
and Rodriguez Transportation Group headquartered in Madrid. 
2) Added value in process. This is mainly achieved through synergy of both 
parties’ expertise. The private party is usually better at knowing the market realities, 
executing the appropriate capital budgeting decision making and more efficient at 
managing finances. On the other hand, the public entity can help the private party by 
leveraging its knowledge and competencies of political procedures, legislation, and 
regulations.  This synergy in process is what my decision tree analysis was mainly about.  
3) Added value in Finances. This is achieved mainly through risk allocation and 
financing. It is very beneficial to know that certain financial risks are better handled 
either by the private party while others are better handled by the public party. For 
example, in volatile financial markets, interest rate based risk might be better managed by 
the public entity. On the other hand, private party might be better positioned to have more 
disposable finances at hand than the public entity at some given time.  With the CTTS 
project Cintra/Zachry was able to inject $25 million dollars upfront to help with 
mobilization and project start-up costs that TxDOT could not afford. Also, the 
Concession agreement has a buyback provision, which ensures that at any time during the 
50 year lease period, TxDOT can buy back the project from Cintra/Zachry if it feels that 
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the general public is no longer receiving value—in terms of finances—from the project. 
Mr Russell reports in his testimonial that: 
 
We believe this [the buyback provision] protects the interest of the state and the 
taxpayers by ensuring TxDOT is not overpaying for the asset should it be 
determined it is within the best interest of the citizens to buyback the project 
during the lease. The possibility exists that locking into any specific and/or 
predetermined values could potentially lock the state into undesirable terms10. 
 
4) External added value. For example, effects on proximate areas or industries and 
creation of jobs. When efficiently handled, a PPP project can positively affect 
surrounding peoples and property. By providing a public good in partnership with a 
government entity, the private party gets in the good books of the public. Also, the public 
entity reaps benefit from the fact that a private firm invests in an undesirable public space 
that would not have been developable had it not been for incentives it gave to the private 
party. This is what UDAG did for distressed urban area in 1977. In fact because of the 
infusion of money by the private firm, government could reap cash that it uses to create 
jobs or retire debts.   
Besides the above four general ways that PPPs add value, there are eight specific 
ways that values is added.  
First, there is added value to the relationship between both partners and the 
general public. It is important that the general public relate well with the parties 
delivering projects.  There are two forms of relationships: economic and social. 
Economic relations come about because people want to exchange resources or because of 
external forces. Social relations come about because humans are social animals. For 
public projects, this translates into the general public wanting and having the right to 
know who is building what for them. The better the relationship, the better cooperation 
                                                 
10 TxDOT Testimony by Russell, Pg. 7 
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the public can give to the infrastructure provider. By having a private firm teaming up 
together with the government, the PPP formed is better placed to absorb any criticism or 
opposition from the general public. This criticism and opposition usually comes from two 
camps of people: those members of the public who distrust or hate government run 
projects, and on the other hand, those people who distrust or hate private firms engaging 
in public good delivery. Since the PPP is partly private and partly government, it has a lot 
of flexibility and opportunity to put on either face depending on what is better suited to 
hand any conflict with the public. For example, in case of public opposition to road tolls 
by a private firm owner, the government can regulate usage privileges by the poor 
(Kassens questionnaire answer).  
Second, there is great benefit reaped by the natural cheap transfer of technology 
and skills between the government and private party. Without the PPP, government 
would have to pay exorbitant prices for private skills and technology. Along the same 
line of reasoning, without a PPP, the private party would have to laboriously lobby 
government for favorable legislation or regulation. By locking arms together, all the 
necessary transfers happen in-house within the PPP framework.  
Third, there is tax benefit involved with PPPs that could be the difference between 
a project going forward and project abandonment. According to Savas (240) every dollar 
spent on a project by a private company translates into at least two dollars of tax revenue 
for the government. This is a lot of money. Unless a private firm is robust enough to 
discount such future tax expenditures, many firms would not be able to financially go 
ahead with a project that means heavy taxation. In a PPP, government can waive taxing a 
private party to ensure that projects are financially viable. Consequently, the general 
public benefits by getting infrastructure that it would otherwise never have gotten.  
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Fourth, having a government entity onboard helps with public opinion or political 
influences that can enable the project carry on smoothly. A private firm going it alone 
could face unnecessary negative public opinion or hostile political interferences.  
Sometimes public opposition to private ownership of facilities builds up because private 
firms reap exorbitant profits from public tolls. This is because public goods turn into a 
property to be enjoyed by the wealthy who can afford the tolls. Kassens (see 
questionnaire in Appendix B) says that governments can mitigate this shortcoming by 
regulating usage privileges for the poor in society.    
Fifth, a PPP is best suited to deal with added social value because it can balance 
the opposing interests of the two parties. On one hand the government entity has a public 
role to add social value in whatever project it engages in, but a private firm’s paramount 
interest is to make profits. Teaming up with a government entity means that an aggressive 
firm will be checked by the interests of the government entity which are usually pro 
social equity.  
Sixth,   by working more closely with private business, governments can benefit 
from private firm’s use of market forces (Bult-Spiering & Dewulf, 35). Benefits like 
efficiency, knowledge and customer satisfaction are market strengths that are a staple of 
private businesses. When they are transferred to a government entity, its public sector 
performance and product delivery is greatly improved. 
Seventh, PPPs stimulate the private sector to undertake life-cycle approaches that 
it would not have taken had it not partnered with a government party. Together with the 
fact that private firms are more efficient and better at supply chain management, PPPs 
work to improve the price/quality ratio of the actual project (Bult-Spiering & Dewulf, 
35). Early private sector involvement in projects makes it more aware of the project’s 
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long-term benefits to society. Good PPPs are not centered only on toll collection by the 
private party but “long term [operational] and maintenance agreements” (Norment, 8)  
Lastly, PPPs can help in contributing to sustainability in infrastructure systems. 
Sustainability aims to balance social equity, economical viability and environmental 
stewardship.   While the government involvement ensures that the project works to 
produce equity for the public, and the private firm contributes technical and financial 
tools that lead to economical viability, a PPP also directly contributes to environmental 
stewardships. Rouhani (2009) discusses how a private firm’s participation in 
transportation road systems usually involves the concessionaire levying tolls for public 
usage of the facility, which action helps to prevent congestion on roads and in turn 
reduces environmental externalities like pollution and accidents. Rouhani also discusses 
another innovation called a Credit Based Congestion Pricing (CBCP) which can help in 
decongestion on roads and also transfer money from the high-users to other sectors of 
society. For a CBCP, “drivers receive monthly travel credits in a revenue neutral 
approach. Users do not pay money unless they go beyond all of their travel credits. The 
travel credits can be in terms of money or can be traded and converted to money” 
(Rouhani, 99). This effectively restricts over-usage of the public good, and at the same 
time harvests money from heavy users, which money can be used in other sectors of 
society.  
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Limits to PPPs 
Although PPPs have tremendous benefits that I have stipulated in the above 
section, they are not the answer to all project undertakings. It is vital to know that there 
are six shortcomings with PPPs which should be analyzed and studied before you venture 
into a contract. These shortcomings come about mainly because the ideal cooperation 
model between the public and private entities is seldom achieved and the general public’s 
opposition about a private firm delivering public goods is a real big hindrance. 
First, the financial advantages could be eclipsed by the fact that transaction costs 
can increase due to a lengthy process of selecting the private entity (Bult-Spiering & 
Dewulf, 36). Other than Spain where PPPs have been streamlined to have extremely short 
procurement periods, the rest of the world is fraught with overdrawn-out PPP frameworks 
characterized by lengthy times for   choosing among several companies and increased 
negotiation timeframes. Unless a PPP comes up with an innovative mechanism like 
CTTS’ Comprehensive Development Agreement, suboptimal PPP procurement translates 
into increased contractual fees. Furthermore, the long-term contract periods granted to 
concessionaires could turn into a burden due to changes within the private firm over the 
years. Also, unless all the money is provided by the public entity because it can usually 
borrow money at low interests, it is hard to ignore the fact that when private firms 
contribute money, since it is coming in from high interest rate borrowings from capital 
markets, the cost is usually passed onto to the consumer.  
Second, Bult-Spiering & Dewulf (37) point out that despite the focus on better 
value for money and the benefits of  innovation, especially in concession PPPs, it is a 
market reality that “low costs” are still used as the main selection criterion. This practice 
is a clear break from the ideal PPP model which calls for selections based on the total 
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package of what a contractor is offering.  As a result, this tendency prevents selections 
based on “best value” where performance and costs are balanced, which is what PPPs are 
primarily for. Smith writes about how this limitation was handled in the SH 130 project 
by deliberately including “other factors” other than price: “technical design/approach, 
innovation, qualifications, experience, key personnel, minimizing public impacts (i.e 
traffic maintenance), QA/QC approach, schedule” (Smith, 11). 
Third, the performance of a PPP will largely depend on the intangible factor of 
behavior by the parties and also the nature of the public interest (Bult-Spiering & Dewulf, 
39). However well-formulated a PPP might be, if it is not aligned with the prevailing 
public interest, all effort to deliver services might be frustrated. Also, the parties’ 
willingness to cooperate or fitness for the job, determine the extent at which the PPP will 
be successful. For example if the private firm’s reputation is characterized by  bad public 
relationships, its effort to be a good provider of a PPP public service might be met with a 
cynical or opposing public. Mr. Kiggundu’s strong critique of PPPs (See newspaper 
article in Appendix E) is based on evaluating PPP performance largely on “what can go 
wrong” as opposed to the ideal framework. Specifically, he emphasizes bad policies, 
unforeseen economic circumstances that call for changing the PPP framework but is 
unheeded, and the fact that many so-called “private parties” come into contract with ill-
meaning interests based solely on profit maximization.  
Fourth, many PPPs erroneously focus on maximizing profit alone, instead of the 
value to society or less quantifiable long-term benefits. In other words, there is a 
tendency for parties to form a PPP as if it were a for-profit venture. This prevents the 
attainment of the above benefits. There are intangible benefits like Environmental 
Sustainability and Social/Cultural benefits that should be put in mind when setting up 
PPPs. This limit is exacerbated when you realize that some PPPs operate and function 
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like a privatization scheme. It is very important to draw a distinction between 
privatization—a total transfer of ownership from the government to private firms—and a 
PPP.  
Fifth, many people tend to approach PPP from a political perspective instead of a 
rational view. This leads to inefficient results from the joint venture or concession. From 
a political point of view, some public entities want to control the workings of a PPP, but 
they forget that oftentimes government does not have the technical and financial 
resources needed. An example of this practice is what happened in the Russian 
Federation when the government forced Shell to sell its majority share in Sakhalin 2 Oil 
project, which effectively made the Russian government take over ownership. It is 
paramount that you approach the formation of PPPs from a rational framework 
independent of the political/emotional sentiments that oftentimes sabotage good PPP 
implementation.   
Lastly, there are also contract issues that arise from PPP formation. For example, 
a PPP contract might not have provisions to handle problems that arise when unforeseen 
issues like force majeure11 occur. In such instances, since the public entity relies on 
legislature to get its money, oftentimes, the legislature might not approve extra money in 
such emergencies, or if it does, the monies might come too late. Consequently, the public 
party to a PPP could default on its contract obligations. Contract issues could also come 




11 Force Majeure is a natural occurrence that can not be prevented by human actions.  
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Conclusion and Recommendation 
Civil Infrastructure is needed in every country of the world, both among 
developed countries and developing countries. However, governments alone can not 
manage to put up the money for building infrastructure, and also the complexity involved 
both financially and technically call for governments to seek help from the marketplace. 
Naturally, any private involvement in project delivery of infrastructure is met with 
opposition from the public, and given that many a private firm would only look out for 
the best interest of its shareholders, it is paramount that private firms’ involvement in 
public good delivery should be in a form of formal partnership with the government 
entity. Presently, such formal partnerships take the form of Public-Private Partnerships. I 
have shown that these PPPs, specifically Concessions and Joint Ventures,  have more 
synergistic benefits than either government run or fully privatized projects.  
These synergistic benefits fall under three main categories: risk benefits 
(financial, legal and project based), management and communication benefits, and added 
value to society. There is a need to go beyond making decisions about a project based 
only on results from capital budgeting calculations. PPPs are best suited to go beyond 
purely capital budgeting analysis, to factor in non-economical factors. My decision tree 
analysis and Monte carol simulation model of the SH 130 project case study give 
quantitative support to all the benefits I discuss in the main part of this paper.  
Nonetheless, there are limits to what PPPs can achieve. These limits come about 
due to failure to create the ideal PPP model and also inherit operational and managerial 
habits by the individual parties. But instead of concentrating on the shortcomings of 
particular PPPs, the analysis should be geared towards the PPP models themselves, and I 
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have shown, the PPP models offer far more advantages than the traditional procurement 
models.    
To improve the research and analysis I have carried out herein, you need to gather 
more data on the actual performance of various PPPs as opposed to just one case study 
that I have used. Also, you need to factor in the cultural differences between peoples that 
might be affected by PPPs. While in the U.S.A there is generally a lot of public support 
for private involvement in Infrastructure projects, less liberal countries might have 




Appendix A: Spectrum of Public-Private Partnerships 
 
 
(Source: Bult-Spiering, M. & Dewulf, G.,3) 
1) Public Regulation: no involvement of private parties 
2) Lobbying of public parties by private parties 
3) Consultation and co-option of private parties 
4) Co-regulation of public and private parties (e.g private parties as negotiation 
partners): joint decision making by public and private parties. 
5) Delegation of private parties (e.g standard setting): participation of public 
parties 
6) Private self-regulation in the shadow of hierarchy (e.g voluntary agreements): 
involvement of public parties. 
7) Public adoption of private regulation: output control by public parties 
8) Private self-regulation (purely private regimes): no public involvement 




Appendix B: Questionnaire 
This is the Questionnaire I sent out to two professional experts (Eva Kassens, phD 
and Mike Watry, P.E) who have worked with projects involving Public-Private 
Partnerships.  
 
1. In your professional experience, what do you think is the future of public-private 
partnerships in infrastructure? 
 
2. Have you found any tangible examples that show that privately owned roads fair 
better than publicly owned roads? 
 
3. What are some of the major financial or other risks that you find in privately 
owned infrastructure systems? 
 
4. What is the downside of having private companies own public goods? 
 
5. What is the best way to satisfy the public opposition to private ownership of 
public infrastructure? 
 
6. What is the best Public-Private partnership arrangement you know of or 
recommend? 
 
7. Is it possible to achieve the benefits of private ownership without physically 
transferring the public infrastructure into private hands? 
 




The filled-in questionnaire is as follows.  
 
QUESTIONNAIRE- EVA KASSENS, PhD  
1. In your professional experience, what do you think is the future of public-private 
partnerships in infrastructure? 
I think pubic-private partnerships are going to be the future for at least road 
transport. With funding cut short for public transport agencies by national 
governments, investments, private companies are willing to make, are more than 
welcome to advance urban and cross-country mobility. 
 
2. Have you found any tangible examples that show that privately owned roads fair 
better than publicly owned roads? 
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The privately owned roads are usually better maintained and hence safer to drive on. 
Furthermore, they are not as crowded as publicly owned ones due to the pricing 
structure. 
 
3. What are some of the major financial or other risks that you find in privately 
owned infrastructure systems? 
The private investor does not take great risks. The road is paid for by the users and 
sometimes the investor even makes a profit. Usually the road is returned to the public 
after 30 years of usage. Thereafter, the public is responsible in maintaining the roads, 
then, when the roads start to need repairs. 
 
4. What is the downside of having private companies own public goods? 
The downside it the “only for profit” thinking. Private transport – as it is – usually 
appeals to the wealthier population, yet cars have become in most cities (except 
Boston, NYC, Chicago, San Fran and Washington) a necessity for all travelers. With 
roads being priced, this will burden the less-well-off in our society even more. 
 
5. What is the best way to satisfy the public opposition to private ownership of 
public infrastructure? 
Granting driving privileges/exemptions for the poor   
 
6. What is the best Public-Private partnership arrangement you know of or 
recommend? 
There are many good examples – it is a matter from which perspective. I do not 
believe there is a win-win solution for all. 
 
7. Is it possible to achieve the benefits of private ownership without physically 
transferring the public infrastructure into private hands? 
Yes lease or rent…..however, there is not much difference as far as I know whether 
the roads “belong” or do not belong to the public – the outcome for the user – 
pricing structure – remains the same. 
 
8. Why do some governments have reservations about putting public goods in 
private hands? 
I think they feel they are disadvantaging the poor. With no good public transit system 




Appendix C: Central Texas Turnpike System Details 
(Source: http://www.centraltexasturnpike.org/ctts/) 
The Central Texas Turnpike System (CTTS) is a new transportation system that 
will improve overall traffic mobility, facilitate access to regional services, and 
increase travel safety for Central Texas residents, workers, and visitors. The 
system will initially consist of the 2002 Project, which includes three elements: 
SH 130 (49 miles), which begins north of Georgetown, Texas and runs to US 183 
in southeast Travis County (extending to I-10 when funding becomes available); 
SH 45N (approximately 13 miles), from Ridgeline Blvd. west of US 183 to SH 
130; and the Loop 1 Extension (approximately three miles), which runs from FM 
734 (Parmer Lane) to SH 45N. The system will also include any future projects 
added to the system under the Texas Turnpike Act, as well as other roads, bridges, 
or other toll facilities for which the Texas Transportation Commission has 
responsibility and is collecting tolls. The project is being financed in part with the 
proceeds of bond obligations. Additional funding is provided through state, local, 
federal, and private sources from investment earnings. 
 
The 2002 Project is providing 65 miles of new roadway to Central Texas. Total 
project financing is $3.6 billion, including design, construction, right of way 
acquisition, and other financing costs (insurance, debt service, interest, etc). The 
2002 Project will be completed almost 25 years sooner than conventional 
transportation construction projects due to the innovative financing (a 
combination of public, private, bond financing) and, in the case of SH 130, a new 
contractual arrangement referred to as a Comprehensive Development Agreement 
(CDA). Under the CDA, a single contractor or consortium of contractors is 




Central Texas Turnpike Project 2002 Project (as of August 29, 2002) 
Estimated Initial Sources and Uses of Funds 
(Source: http://www.centraltexasturnpike.org/ctts/) 
Source Cost 
Proceeds from 2002 Bonds: $ 2,268 M 
2002 TIFIA Bonds: $ 16 M 
TxDOT Funding Obligation $ 700 M 
Estimated Local Contribution for ROW $ 512 M 
Interest $ 163 M 
 
Total estimated sources for 2002 project $ 3,659 M 
Estimated Uses 
Uses Cost 
Construction including engineering costs $ 2,247 M 
ROW costs $ 695 M 
Interest $ 527 M 
Reserve Fund, Insurance and Issuance costs $ 190 M 
 
Total estimated uses for 2002 project $ 3,659 M 
Project Construction 
& Design 
ROW & Util. 
Relocation 
Total 
Loop 1 & 
SH 45 North 
$1,041M $391M $1,432M 
SH 130 $1,206M $304M $1,510M  
Total $2,247M $695 M $2,942 M 
Blended interest rate: Approx. 5.4% on long term bonds 
Project Elements 
• SH 130 - from north of Georgetown to U.S. 183 south of Austin (49 miles)  
• Loop 1 - from FM 734 (Parmer Lane) to SH 45 North (3 miles)  
• SH 45 North - from Ridgeline Blvd West of U.S. 183 to SH 130 (13 miles) 
This brief summary is subject to all terms, provisions and details relating to the bonds, 
project and system which are contained in the Official Statement dated Aug. 7, 2002. The 




Appendix D: Cintra Zackry Team Factsheet 
(Source: http://www.corridorwatch.org/ttc/pdf/fact%20sheet%20-%20Cintra-
Zachry%20-%20031105%20FINAL.pdf) 
A team led by Cintra Concesiones de Infraestructuras de Transporte, S.A. and 
Zachry Construction Corporation was selected by the Texas Department of 
Transportation (TxDOT) to develop the first phase of the Trans-Texas Corridor – a 




Cintra/Zachry represents a coalition of Texas, national and international 
transportation experts with decades of experience in financing, constructing, operating 
and managing major public and private roadway systems. The team also includes 
Ferrovial-Agroman, Earth Tech, Inc.; PriceWaterhouseCooper, LLP; JP Morgan 
Securities, Inc.; Bracewell and Patterson, Pate Engineers, Inc.; and Rodriguez 
Transportation Group.Headquartered in Madrid, Spain, with subsidiaries on three 
continents, Cintra is one of the world’s largest private-sector developers of transport 
infrastructure, with committed equity investments of more than $2.1 billion. Cintra is a 
publicly held company listed in Madrid’s Stock Exchange. More than 60 percent of 
Cintra is held by the Madrid-based Grupo Ferrovial, founded as a construction company 
in 1952. Ferrovial is now a diversified and stable group that ranks among the top five 
construction groups by market capitalization in Europe. Its subsidiary, Ferrovial 
Agroman, has completed construction projects in more than 40 countries and forms, 
together with Zachry, the construction arm of the team. 
 
Zachry Construction Corporation is a privately held company founded in 1924 
and headquartered in San Antonio, Texas. The company provides a wide array of services 
including construction, project development, construction management and industrial 
maintenance to both domestic and international customers in the public and private 
sectors. Engineering News Record lists Zachry among the nation’s top 25 construction 
companies. Zachry currently employs 13,000 people, and its construction projects can be 
found from coast to coast, with a concentration in Texas and the southeastern sector of 
the United States. 
 
CINTRA/FERROVIAL BUSINESS BACKGROUND 
 
 Cintra (www.cintra.es) is a publicly traded company based in Madrid, Spain. 
Cintra has a market capitalization of approximately $5 billion. The company has 
years of successful transportation experience, including major investment and 
operating interests in the Chicago Skyway, the 407 ETR highway in Toronto, 
Canada, and highway investments in Spain, Ireland, Chile and Portugal. Cintra is 
also the leader in the parking lot business in Spain, currently managing more than 
200,000 parking slots. 
 
 Cintra’s parent company, Grupo Ferrovial (www.ferrovial.com) is also publicly 
traded. Ferrovial was founded in 1952 and has a market capitalization of 
approximately $6.7 billion. Ferrovial has 49,000 employees in 12 countries, 
including the US, Canada, UK, Australia, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Italy, and 
Chile. Other significant investments of Ferrovial are in the Bristol and Belfast 
(UK) and Sydney (Australia) airports. Ferrovial, through its subsidiary Amey 
(UK) is also involved in the maintenance and management of the London 
Subway. 
 
ZACHRY BUSINESS BACKGROUND 
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 Zachry Construction Corporation is comprised of five large business units: Heavy 
Construction, Building Construction, Power, Industrial Maintenance and 
Industrial Process with total current 2 contracts exceeding $3 billion. The roots of 
the company lay in the construction of major transportation projects, with 
particular focus in the State of Texas. In fact, Zachry currently has more than $1 
billion in design-build highway and infrastructure construction contracts in Texas. 
 
 Other representative projects include a three-year engineering, procurement and 
construction (EPC) contract with Freeport LNG Development, L.P., near 
Freeport, Texas; an EPC contract with Exxon Mobil Oil Corporation for the 
Beaumont Cogeneration Facility in Beaumont, Texas; and a three-year 
maintenance contract with Chevron Phillips for five of its domestic facilities in 
Cedar Bayou, Pasadena, Port Arthur, and Orange facilities in Texas as well as the 
St. James facility in St. James, Louisiana. 
 
 Zachry’s International division contracts are primarily for embassy construction 
for the Department of State. Current projects include embassy construction in 
Managua, Nicaragua and Phnom Penh, Cambodia; Zachry is the lead in a joint 




 In addition to Cintra and Zachry, our team includes: 
 Ferrovial-Agroman (Madrid, Spain) 
 Earth Tech, Inc. (California/offices in Texas) 
 Bracewell & Patterson, LLP (Texas) 
 Rodriguez Transportation Group (Texas) 
 Aguirre & Fields, LP (Texas) 
 OTHON, Inc. (Texas) 
 Pate Engineers (Texas) 
 HRM Consultants, Inc. (Texas) 
 P1 Resources (Texas) 
 Southwestern Capital Markets Inc. (Texas) 
 Railroad Industries Incorporated (Nevada) 
 Amey, PLC (UK) 
 Mercator Advisors, LLC (Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C) 
 Public Resources Advisory Group (New York) 
 PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (New York/offices in Texas) 
 JP Morgan Securities, Inc. (New York) 
 
THE TRANS-TEXAS CORRIDOR 
 
 The vast majority of those working on Cintra/Zachry’s Trans-Texas Corridor 
project –workers, sub-contractors, suppliers, etc. – will be Texans. Cintra, 
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Ferrovial Agroman and Zachry Construction will finance, design, build and 
operate TTC 35 in a manner in which Texas workers, sub-contractors and 
suppliers will be employed to get the job done. All of the project’s construction 
work will be handled by Texans and Texas sub-contractors. 
 
Estimates show this project will create more than 140,000 direct and indirect 
Texas jobs. 
 
 The Cintra/Zachry team’s Trans-Texas Corridor proposal is just the start of the 
CDA process and should not be viewed as a final plan. Cintra/Zachry will work 
with TxDOT to craft more detailed plans and proposals. The initial proposal may 
change significantly before final plans are approved as environmental approvals, 
community and traffic assessments and other detailed studies advance toward 
final determination. 
 
 Cintra/Zachry looks forward to partnering with the Texas Department of 
Transportation on this important and innovative project.  
 
 Our team will get needed roads built more quickly at very little cost to taxpayers 
and even expect to return money to the state. Our road projects utilize the latest 
design and construction techniques to help assure safety, environmental quality 
and convenience for motorists and surrounding communities. 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 For the third consecutive year, Ferrovial has been confirmed in the Dow Jones 
Sustainability Indexes. As in 2003, it is the only Spanish construction group 
chosen to form part of both the world's and Europe’s leading sustainability 
indexes. The DJ Sustainability indexes are one of the world’s prime references for 
companies committed to criteria of sustainability. 
 
 Cintra and Ferrovial have long records of environmental and social responsibility. 
In 1997, Ferrovial became the world’s first construction company to implement a 
certified standards-compliant environmental management system. 
 
 In 2002, Ferrovial became a member of The Global Compact, an initiative 
involving UN organizations, workers’ associations, non-governmental 
organizations, and others committed to promoting and respecting nine universal 
principles in the field of human rights, labor and the environment. 
 
 The Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) will oversee and ensure full 
compliance with the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), in concert 
with appropriate state and federal agencies. The Cintra/Zachry team will follow 
all rules set forth by TxDOT, the EPA and other key government agencies. 
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Appendix E: Private rail concessions not a viable transport policy 
(Source: Amin Tamale Kiggundu www.monitor.co.ug Sept 29th, 2009) 
Some local scribes have described East Africa’s first private rail concession as a 
total failure. The Rift Valley Rail (RVR) concession was granted in 2006 for 25 
years, aiming to attract private investment capital and modernise the rail systems 
in Kenya and Uganda. As a landlocked country with a poor export record, Uganda 
was forced to grant the above private rail concession because rail transport is 
extremely critical in reducing the cost of production and improving national 
economic competitiveness. 
Experience from several East Asian countries however, shows that private rail 
concessions may not always be a viable transportation policy. In both Malaysia 
and the Philippines for example, private rail concessions were found by a 2004 
World Bank study to be underperforming in part because of the unrealistic 
expectations of their designers and promoters. 
Among the key unrealistic expectations was the assumption that the 
concessionaires would provide all the needed investment capital and avoid 
government funding. Due to the 1997 Asian financial debacle, the central 
governments in both Malaysia and the Philippines were forced to adopt several 
new transport policy interventions.  
In Malaysia, the federal government spent about $ 1.7 billion to rescue the two 
failing and financially troubled private light rail transit companies, Putra and Star. 
The two rail companies had failed to service their bank loans because of currency 
devaluation and general decline in economic activity. The World Bank study also 
revealed that in both Malaysia and the Philippines, private rail concessions failed 
to produce a viable and replicable funding model for rail transport. 
Importantly, private rail concessions in the above two East Asian countries were 
not well structured and designed. For example, the investment risks were not 
efficiently allocated. Risks are allocated efficiently when they are allocated to the 
party best able to manage them. The practice in both Malaysia and the Philippines 
was to transfer all the investment risk to the private rail concessionaires. 
Obviously, the private sector may not be able to carry out certain formidable tasks 
such as policy formulation and implementation, control and regulation of foreign 
currency markets as well as control of the inflation. Given the numerous 
investment risks associated with private rail concessions, it is critical that coherent 
and strategic partnerships between the government and the private sector are 
formed. 
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One area where public-private sector partnerships may be necessary and 
beneficial is the mobilisation of the investable funds. Under these partnerships the 
government may offer soft loans as a way of shielding the private rail 
concessionaires from the high interest rates associated with commercial bank 
loans. 
It is also necessary to explore the possibility of using the opportunity offered by 
the emergence of China as a global economic power. With more than $2 trillion 
of unencumbered foreign currency reserves, China would be more than willing to 
help in modernising our rail systems. Aside from the global politics, this will 
serve as a way of accessing key mineral recourses such as gold, diamond and 
petroleum especially in Uganda and Congo. 
Last but not least, since the existing rail system was built by the currently 
recession hit and seemingly broke Western countries, it would be appropriate to 
invite another group of rich countries from Asia to modernise it. 
Dr Kiggundu is a lecturer - Makerere University and executive director, Centre 




1. CDA: Comprehensive Development Agreement. This is a tool TxDOT 
uses to enable private development of and, in some cases, private 
investments in the Texas transportation system. 
2. Eminent Domain: The right by a government entity to deprive private 
people of their property by legally grabbing the property at market or 
below market price. 
3. Equivalent Annual Cost (EAC): is a capital budgeting method which 
uses the discounted cost per year of owning and operating an asset.  
4. Force Majeure: A natural occurrence that can not be prevented by human 
actions. 
5. Internal Rate of Return: A capital budgeting method which uses the 
discounted cash flow when NPV equals Zero, without considering outside 
factors like inflation and financial interest rates.  
6. Modified Internal Rate of Return (MIRR): This is a capital budgeting 
method which corrects some of the problems inherit in the IRR. E.g the 
fact that IRR does not correctly give answers to project with alternative 
positive and negative cash flows.  
7. Net Present Value (NPV): A capital budgeting method which uses the net 
value of all future cash flows discounted to the present time.  
8. NTP: Notice To Proceed. A document that a constructor needs before it 
can begin constructing a project.  
9. TIFIA: Transportation Infrastructure Financing and Innovation Act. 
10. TxDOT: Texas Department of Transportation 
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11. Real Option: The adjustments that a firm can make after a project is 
underway.  
12. UDAG: Urban Development Action Grant. This was a federal program 
enacted in the Jimmy Carter presidency (1977) with the purpose of 
loaning money to revitalize distressed urban centers by acting as an 
incentive for private sector investment.   
13. WACC: Weighted Average Cost of Capital. The minimum rate that a 
company has to repay all the people and entities that have invested capital 
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